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Abstract When thinking about ethics, technology is often only mentioned as the
source of our problems, not as a potential solution to our moral dilemmas. When
thinking about technology, ethics is often only mentioned as a constraint on
developments, not as a source and spring of innovation. In this paper, we argue that
ethics can be the source of technological development rather than just a constraint
and technological progress can create moral progress rather than just moral prob-
lems. We show this by an analysis of how technology can contribute to the solution
of so-called moral overload or moral dilemmas. Such dilemmas typically create a
moral residue that is the basis of a second-order principle that tells us to reshape the
world so that we can meet all our moral obligations. We can do so, among other
things, through guided technological innovation.
Keywords Moral overload  Engineering  Technological progress
Introduction
Engineers are often confronted with moral dilemmas in their design work because
they are presented with conﬂicting (value) requirements (cf.Van de Poel 2009).
They are supposed to accommodate for example both safety and efﬁciency, security
and privacy, accountability and conﬁdentiality. The standard reaction to moral
dilemmas is to try and weigh up the different moral considerations and establish
which values are more important for the engineering task at hand, think about trade-
offs or justiﬁcations for giving priority to one of the values at play. It seems only
natural to think about moral solutions to moral problems arrived at by moral means.
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dilemmas are amenable to a technical solution. We tend to forget that since a moral
dilemma is constituted by a situation in the world which does not allow us to realize
all our moral obligations in that situation at the same time, solutions to a dilemma
may also be found by changing the situation in such a way that we can satisfy all our
value commitments. We argue here that some moral dilemmas may very well have
engineering solutions and that certain types of moral dilemmas can be tackled by
means of technical innovations. Our analysis draws attention to a special feature of
the responsibility of engineers, namely the responsibility to prevent situations which
are morally dilemmatic and which must inevitably lead to suboptimal solutions or
compromises and trade-offs from a moral point of view. We start our analysis from
a familiar place: the analysis of moral dilemmas and the problem of moral overload.
We are repeatedly confronted by situations in which we cannot satisfy all the things
thataremorallyrequiredofus.Sometimesourmoralprinciplesandvaluecommitments
can simply not all be satisﬁed atthe same time given the way the world is. The result is
that we are morally ‘overloaded’. These situations have been extensively studied in
moral philosophy, rational choice theory and welfare economics and are referred to as
‘hard choices’, ‘moral dilemmas’ or ‘conﬂicting preferences’ (e.g. Kuran 1998;V a n
Fraassen 1970;L e v i1986). The problem that has received most of the attention is the
question of how we ought to decide in these dilemmatic cases between the various
options and alternatives open to the agent. There is however another aspect that has
received far less attention and that is sometimes referred to as ‘‘the moral residue’’, i.e.
the moral emotions and psychological tensions that are associated with the things that
werenotdone,theroadnottravelled,themoraloptionforgone.Amoralresidueprovides
thosewhoareexposedtoitwithanincentivetoavoidmoraloverloadinthefuture.Itcan
therefore function as a motor for improvement, in fact as a motor for technological
innovation. If an instance of technological innovation successfully reduces moral
overload it constitutes an instance of moral progress, so we will argue.
Moral Overload and Moral Dilemmas
Timur Kuran (1998) has referred to situations in which we have different value
commitments by which we cannot live simultaneously as situations of ‘‘moral
overload’’. The basic idea of moral overload is that an agent is confronted with a
choice situation in which different obligations apply but in which it is not possible
to fulﬁl all these obligations simultaneously.
Kuran provides the following moredetaileddeﬁnitionofmoral overload.Anagent
A has to make a particular decision in a choice situation in which A can only choose
one option. The options she can choose from form together the opportunity set X,
which is deﬁned by physical and practical constraints. The agent has a number of
valuesVa…Vx;eachofthesevaluesrequireshertoavoidasubsetoftheoptions.More
speciﬁcally the values instruct the agent to keep vn[vn, where vn is the actual
realisationofvalueVnbyanoptionandvnathresholdthatVnshouldatleastmeet.The
setoffeasibleoptionsthatmeetallthesevaluethresholdsformsthemoralopportunity
set X
m (see Fig. 1).
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cannot live by her values. This situation is deﬁned as moral overload. In a situation
of moral overload the agent is not only confronted with a difﬁcult choice problem,
she is also forced to do something that violates her values; moral overload therefore
results in a feeling of moral guilt or moral regret.
The notion of moral overload is quite similar to what others have described as a
moral dilemma. The most basic deﬁnition of a moral dilemma is the following
(Williams 1973:180):
(1). The agent ought to do a
(2). The agent ought to do b
(3). The agent cannot do a and b
One available option of action meets one obligation but not the other. The agent
again can fulﬁl the second obligation, but not without violating the ﬁrst. Conﬂicting
moral obligations create moral dilemmas. The nature, structure and logic of moral
dilemmas has been extensively studies and has been discussed among others by Bas
van Fraassen (1970), Bernard Williams (1973) and Ruth Marcus (1980).
William’s deﬁnition of a moral dilemma is somewhat different from Kuran’s
deﬁnition of moral overload because it is deﬁned in terms of ‘oughts’ instead of in
terms of ‘values’ and because it is deﬁned over two options a and b instead of over a
larger set of options, but the basic deontic structure is obviously the same. For our
current purpose, Levi’s (1986:5) deﬁnition of what he calls ‘moral struggle’ is
particularly relevant:
(1). The agent endorses one or more value commitments P1,P 2, …,P n.
(2). Value commitment Pi stipulates that in contexts of deliberation of type Ti, the
evaluation of feasible options should satisfy constraint Ci.
Fig. 1 The moral opportunity set X
m. Under certain conditions X
m may be empty, so creating moral
overload. (The ﬁgure is based on Fig. 1 in Kuran 1998:235)
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the types T1,T 2, …,T n so that all constraints C1,C 2, …,C n are supposed to
apply.
(4). The decision problem currently faced is one where the constraints C1,C 2, …,
Cn cannot all be jointly satisﬁed.
Levi sees his deﬁnition of moral struggle, which is almost identical to Kuran’s
deﬁnition of moral overload, as a more general characterisation of moral dilemmas.
It is not only more general because it applies to a set of options and a set of value
commitments instead of just two options and two ‘oughts’ but also because the
notion of value commitment is more general than the notion of ‘ought.’ According
to Levi, value commitments may be represented as moral principles, but also as
‘expressions of life goals, personal desires, tastes or professional commitments’
(Levi, 1986:5). This suggests that we also can have non-moral overload generated
by conﬂicting non-moral value commitments in a choice situation. We may, for
example, have a conﬂict between a prudential and a moral value or between two
prudential values or two preferences.
Strategies for Dealing With Moral Overload
There are various strategies for dealing with moral overload or moral dilemmas. In
this section we will discuss several of such strategies. We will see that although
these strategies may be more or less adequate in the individual choice situation, they
in most cases do not take away what has been called the ‘moral residue.’ Moral
residue here refers to the fact that even if we may have made a justiﬁed choice in the
case of moral overload or a moral dilemma, there remains a duty unfulﬁlled, a value
commitment not met.
One way to deal with a moral dilemma is to look for the option that is best all
things considered. Although this can be done in different ways, it will usually imply
a trade-off among the various relevant value commitments. The basic idea here is
that the fact that an option x does not meet value commitment Pi with respect to
value Vi could be compensated by better meeting one or more of the other values.
Such a strategy reduces the multidimensional decision problem to a one-
dimensional decision-problem.
Value commitments can, however, not always be traded off. This is sometimes
expressed in terms of value incommensurability, i.e. the fact that values cannot
be measured on the same scale (Chang 1997). What makes trade-offs impossible
is, however, probably not just formal incommensurability, i.e. the lack of a
measurement method to compare (degrees of) values on one scale, but rather
substantive incommensurability, i.e. the fact that some values resist trade-offs: less
of one value cannot be compensated by having more of another (Tetlock 2003; Raz
1986; Baron and Spranca 1997). No money in the world can compensate the loss
of a dear friend. Another way of expressing this idea is that if trade-offs or
compensations are tried there is always some residue that cannot be compensated; it
is in fact this residue that creates a feeling of moral guilt or regret that is typical for
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justiﬁed in believing that one value commitment is more important than another one
in a morally dilemmatic choice, this does not take away the occurrence of a moral
residue.
Making value trade-offs is not the only strategy for dealing with moral dilemmas
and moral overload. We will focus here on the various strategies, social mechanisms
and social institutions that Kuran (1998) discusses. He distinguishes three categories
of strategies. The ﬁrst comprises strategies that allow the agent to lower the
threshold for one or more of the value commitments in the particular choice
situation while retaining the long-term value commitments. The second category
of strategies allows the agent to avoid entering into a choice situation that is
characterized by moral overload. The third category is formed by strategies that help
to avoid moral overload by reformulating or revising long-term value commitments.
All of these strategies can be employed by individuals but all of them also have an
institutional component, i.e. they are made possible or made easier through the
existence of certain social institutions that help to alleviate value conﬂict of
individuals.
Kuran discusses three strategies of the ﬁrst category that allow the agent to lower
the threshold for one or more value commitment in the particular choice situation
while retaining the long-term value commitment: compensation, casuistry and
rationalization. Compensation is often not directly possible in the choice situation
because the relevant values in a situation of moral overload resist trade-offs and are
therefore not amenable to direct compensation. However, agents can and often do—
as empirical evidence suggests—compensate a moral loss in one situation by doing
more than is required in a next situation. Compensation may then allow agents to
live by their values over the course of their life, even if they cannot live up to their
value commitments in every choice situation.
1
Kuran describes casuistry, the second strategy, as ‘the use of stratagems to
circumvent a value without discarding it formally’ (Kuran 1998:251). The use of
such tricks is obviously one of the things that gave casuistry a bad name in the past
(cf. Jonsen and Toulmin 1988). It might indeed strike one as wicked to propose this
as a strategy for dealing with moral overload. It might nevertheless have some value
because it helps to preserve the value commitment for future choice situations
without incurring a feeling of guilt in the current choice situation.
In rationalization, the agent tries to rationalize away the conﬂict between two
values. Take the following example. In choosing a means of transport, one may
have the prudential value of ‘comfort’ and the moral value of ‘taking care for the
environment’. The values conﬂict because the most comfortable means of transport,
the car, pollutes the environment more than, for example, the train. The agent may
now rationalize away the conﬂict by arguing that after all the train is more
comfortable than a car for example because you do not have to drive yourself and
1 Compensation may be made easier by social institutions in several ways. Kuran mentions redemption
or the absolution from sins in Christianity as one institution. The modern welfare state also provides
compensation mechanisms, e.g. social workers compensate in taking care of the elderly and those who
need assistance, when family and relatives lack the time to assist as a result of their other value
commitments.
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between the two values, but it also affects the choice made. In the example given the
agent in effect restrained her prudential value in favour of the moral value at play.
The second category of strategies aims at avoiding moral overload. Kuran suggests
two strategies for doing so: escape and compartmentalisation. Escape is a strategy in
which an agent tries to prevent moral overload by avoiding choices. Compartmental-
isation refers to the splitting up of an individual’s life or of society in different contexts
two which different values apply. In as far as compartmentalisation is successful it
avoids the need to choose between two or more values in a speciﬁc choice context.
The third category comprises strategies in which the agent revises her value
commitments in order to avoid moral overload. Kuran refers to this as ‘moral
reconstruction’. Obviously, moral reconstruction only makes sense if an agent is
repeatedly not able to live by her value commitments or if they are independent
reasons to revise a value commitment, for example because it was mistaken in the
ﬁrst place or has become out-dated due to, for example, historical developments. In
the absence of such independent reasons, moral reconstruction to avoid moral
dilemmas is often dubious. As Hansson writes:
More generally, dilemma-avoidance by changes in the code always takes the
form of weakening the code and thus making it less demanding. There are
other considerations that should have a much more important role than
dilemma-avoidance in determining how demanding a moral code should be. In
particular, the major function of a moral code is to ensure that other-regarding
reasons are given sufﬁcient weight in human choices. The effects of a
dilemma per se are effects on the agent’s psychological state, and to let such
considerations take precedence is tantamount to an abdication of morality
(Hansson 1998:413).
Nevertheless,amilderformofmoralreconstruction,notmentionedbyKuran,might
sometimesbeacceptable.Insomecases,itispossibletosubsumetheconﬂictingvalues
underahigherordervalue.Kantians,forexample,tendtobelievethatallvalueconﬂicts
can eventually be solved by having recourse to the only value that is unconditionally
good, the good will. One need not share this optimism, to see that it makes sometimes
perfectsensetotrytoredeﬁnetheconﬂictingvaluesintermofonehigher-ordervalue.A
good example is the formulation of the value ‘sustainable development’ in response to
theperceivedconﬂictbetweenthevalueofeconomicdevelopmentandtheabatementof
poverty on the one hand, and environmental care and care for future generations on the
otherhand.In1987,sustainabledevelopmentwasdeﬁnedbytheBrundlandtcommittee
oftheUNas‘developmentthatmeetstheneedsofthepresentwithoutcompromisingthe
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987).
Although higher order values, like sustainability, may be useful to decide how to
act in a moral dilemma, they do often not just dissolve the dilemma. Often the
overarching value may refer to, or contain, a range of more speciﬁc component
values and norms that are conﬂicting and incommensurable (cf. Chang 1997:16;
Richardson 1997:131). This means that even if a justiﬁed choice may be made in a
dilemmatic situation on basis of an overarching value, a moral residue, in the sense
of a moral value or norm not (fully) met, may still occur.
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overload. Not all replies are, however, equally morally acceptable. Casuistry and
rationalisation, for example, may be psychologically functional, but they may well
lead to morally unacceptable choices. Trying to avoid entering in a moral dilemma
by escape or compartmentalisation may sometimes be morally desirable but is
certainly not always morally praiseworthy. In some circumstances, it may also be
interpreted as a way of neglecting one’s moral responsibilities. As we have seen
also, moral reconstruction, whiles sometimes adequate, may in other circumstances
be unacceptable. Moreover, even if there a morally justiﬁed choice in a dilemmatic
situation, this choice as such does usually not take away the occurrence of a moral
residue.
The occurrence of a moral residue or moral guilt is thus typical for choice under
moral overload. The moral residue or guilt is, however, not just an unfortunate by-
product we have to live with, but it will motivate the agent to organize her live in
such a way that in the future moral overload is reduced. Marcus (1980) has in fact
suggested that we have a second-order duty to avoid moral dilemmas: ‘‘One ought
to act in such a way that, if one ought to do X and one ought to do Y, then one can
do both X and Y.’’ This principle is regulative; the second order ‘ought’ does not
imply ‘can.’ The principle applies to our individual lives, but also entails a
collective responsibility (Marino 2001) to create the circumstances in which we as a
society can live by our moral obligations and our moral values. One way in which
we can do so is by developing new technologies.
Moral Residues as Motors for Technological Innovation
Ruth Marcus (1980) has put forward the following second-order regulatory
principle:
(BF1) One ought to act in such a way that, if one ought to do x and one ought
to do y, then one can do both x and y.
To understand this principle, it is useful ﬁrst to revisit the question whether, and in
what sense, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. If OA (it is obligatory that A), then PA (it is
permitted that A), and therefore MA (it is logically possible that A). In this sense,
OA ? MA is valid. But in many other senses, OA does not entail MA. For example,
if M means ‘‘economically possible,’’ or ‘‘politically possible,’’ or ‘‘physically
possible,’’ or ‘‘biologically possible’’ or ‘‘possible without losing your life,’’ or
‘‘astrologically possible,’’ or ‘‘using only your bare hands and no any instrument
whatsoever,’’ or ‘‘possible with your left thumb,’’ then OA ? MA is invalid. In such
cases, it makes sense to say that OA should imply MA:
(1) O(OA ? MA).
According to standard deontic logic with a possibility operator, (1) is a theorem if
and only if (2) is a theorem (indeed, both (1) and (2) are theorems of that system):
(2) O(OA&OB ? M(A&B)).
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which seems weaker but in fact has the same force:
(BF2) One ought to act in such a way that if one ought to do x, one can do x.
We will refer to ‘‘principle (BF1/BF2)’’ to refer to the principles (BF1) and (BF2)
which can be derived from each other. In cases in which OA& * MA, there is what
Ruth Marcus calls a ‘‘moral residue’’ because OA cannot be fulﬁlled. This may
cause anxiety and distress. What can one do in such cases?
One approach in such situations is to try to avoid entering into a moral dilemma
or situation of moral overload in the ﬁrst place. Principle BF1/BF2, for example
implies that one should not make two promises that cannot be fulﬁlled
simultaneously. More generally, the second category of strategies discussed by
Kuran, which includes the strategies of escape and compartmentalisation, are
relevant here (see previous section).
However, principle BF1/BF2 can also be fulﬁlled by a set of strategies that seems
to be missing in Kuran’s overview: strategies that help to avoid moral overload by
expanding the opportunity set, i.e. by changing the world in such a way that we can
live by all our values. We may refer to this set of strategies as ‘innovation’.
Innovation can be institutional or technical in nature. We are here primarily
interested in innovation which has its origin in engineering, technology and applied
science. Our thesis to be defended here is that technical innovation and engineering
design are important, though often neglected, means for reducing or even avoiding
moral overload on a collective level and dealing with dilemmatic situations and
their moral tensions on an individual level. We argue that technical innovation and
engineering design sometimes offer genuine ways out of moral mazes and provide
opportunities to obviate moral dilemmas and reduce the regret, guilt and moral
residues that are inevitably linked to them.
The crucial point is that innovation can make the impossible possible, not in the
sense of ‘‘logically possible,’’ of course, but in the sense of ‘‘feasible’’ or
‘‘physically realizable.’’ Given technologies S and T, where S is less advanced than
T, it may be the case that *M
SA&M
TA: A is not possible with technology S but A
is possible with technology T. Here M
TA may be explicated as MA&N(MA ? T),
where N means ‘‘necessarily’’: it is possible that A, but only in the presence of T.
Seen from this perspective, (BF1/BF2) admonishes us to look for more advanced
technology in cases in which we cannot fulﬁll our obligations on the basis of current
technology. If N(MA ? T) is true, then principle (BF1/BF2) implies O(OA ? T)
and O(OA ? OA&M
TA). In other words, if OA then we should look for
technology T such that OA&M
TA. It is in this sense that moral residues in
combination with principle (BF1/BF2) can promote technological innovation.
We provide the following examples.
(1) Suppose that your new neighbors have invited you for their house-warming
party and you feel obliged to attend (OA). But you also have to look after your baby
(OB). Suppose also that there is no baby-sitter available. If your actions were
limited to those that were available in Ancient Greece you would have a problem
because *M
G(A&B), where G is Greek technology. However, we now have the
baby phone. It enables you to take care of your baby during your visit to the
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be fulﬁlled. It is in this way that technology may lead to empowerment. If
technology such as the baby phone did not exist, somebody should invent it.
(2)Trade-offbetweensecurityandprivacy. As a Societywe value privacy, but at the
same time we value security and the availability of information about citizens. This
tension isexempliﬁed in the debates about ubiquity ofCCTV cameras inpublicplaces.
Weeitherhangthemeverywhereandhavethedesiredlevelofsecurity(OA)inthatarea
but give up on our privacy (*OB), or out of respect of privacy we do not hang them
everywhere (OB), but settle for less security (*OA). Respect for our privacy may pull
us in the direction of reticence, whereas security pushes us in the direction of making
moreinformationaboutindividualcitizensavailabletotheoutsideworld.SmartCCTV
systems allow us to have our cake and eat it, in the sense that their smart architecture
allows us to enjoy the functionality and at the same time realize the constraints on the
ﬂow and availability of personal data that respect for privacy requires (M
T(A&B)).
These applications are referred to as Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET).
(3) Trade-off between economic growth and sustainability. Environmental
technology in Germany is among the most advanced in the world. One of the
reasons why this is the case is because in Germany in the Sixties the Green Party
was very inﬂuential and articulated the obligation to reconcile economic growth
with the protection of the environment. It is only because this tension between
desirable production and economic growth (OA) was explicitly contrasted with
cherished environmental values (OB) that an opportunity was created to ﬁnd ways
in which the two could be reconciled. Environmental technology is exactly the sort
of smart technology that changes the world in such a way as to allow us to produce
and grow without polluting the environment (M
T(A&B)).
(4)Trade-offbetweenmilitaryeffectivenessandproportionality.Wearesometimes
under an obligation to engage in military interventions which satisfy the universally
accepted principles of ius cogens or ius ad bellum (OA), we at the same time foresee
that these military operations may cause the death of innocent non-combatants (OB).
Here we ﬁnd ourselves torn between two horns of a dilemma in a particular case of a
mission or on a collective level we are morally overloaded since we have two values
which we cannot satisfy at the same time, i.c. destroy the enemies’ weapons of mass
destruction, and on the other hand prevent innocent deaths (*M(A&B)). Non-lethal
weapons or precision/smart weapons ideally allow us to satisfy both obligations
(M
T(A&B))(cf.Cummings2006).Thisexampleonlyservestoexhibitthelogicofthe
military thinking concerning advanced weapons technology. Whether the envisaged
technology really delivers the goods needs to be established independently.
The list of examples of this type is extensible ad lib. For this reason, we propose
the following hypothesis: moral residues in combination with principle (BF1/BF2)
can—and often do—act as motors of technological progress.
Moral Progress and Technological Innovation
Meeting principle (BF1/BF2) can be described as moral progress because it allows
us to better fulﬁl our moral obligations (Marino 2001). We have shown that
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technological innovation can result in moral progress.
The reason why technical innovation can entail moral progress is that it enlarges
the opportunity set. In the examples mentioned, technical innovation moved the
boundary of the opportunity set in the upper right direction (see Fig. 2). As an effect
the moral opportunity set, which was empty in the case of (moral) overload, became
non-empty. Even if the moral opportunity set does not become non-empty the
degree of moral overload is reduced by moving the boundary of the opportunity set
in the upper right direction.
Of course, not all instances of technological innovation entail moral progress.
Whiletechnicalinnovationmayresultinprogressinsomerespects,itmayatthesame
time represent a decline in other important value dimensions. Due to agricultural
innovations, grain output in many western countries has signiﬁcantly increased per
area of land cultivated but it has decreased per unit of energy consumed (Pacey
1983:14). Another reason why technical innovation does not necessarily result in
moralprogressisthatitmayresultina‘technologicalﬁx,’i.e.atechnicalsolutiontoa
problem that is social in nature (Weinberg 1966). Technological ﬁxes are not always
undesirable or inadequate, but there is a danger that what is addressed is not the real
problem but the problem in as far as it is amendable to technical solutions (see also
Sarewitz1996,especially chapter8). Itcan, forexample, be argued thatworldhunger
is not primarily a problem of production capacity, which can be enlarged by technical
innovation, but rather a problem of distribution of food, income and land, which is far
less amendable to technical solutions.
Despite such reservations, we still think that it can be claimed that technical
innovation results in moral progress in those cases in which it means an
improvement in all relevant value dimensions. There is, nevertheless, another
possible objection to this view and, that is, that it assumes a static notion of the
Fig. 2 By extending the opportunity set, the moral opportunity set X
m may become non-empty
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only change the opportunity set but also morality, and thus the value dimensions
along which we judge moral progress (Swierstra et al. 2009).
Although it is true that technology can change morality—think about the change
in sexual morals due to the availability of anticonceptives—we think that
technology-induced moral change at the level of fundamental values are the
exception rather than the rule. In many cases, we can therefore simply assess moral
progress by the standard of current values. Nevertheless, technical innovation may
sometimes make new values dimensions relevant that were not considered in the
design of a technology. We can think of two reasons why this might occur.
One reason is that technical innovation not only enlarges the range of options but
that new options also bring new side-effects and risks. This may introduce new
value dimensions that should be considered in the choice situation and these new
value dimensions may create new forms of moral overload. Nuclear energy may
help to decrease the emission of greenhouse gases and at the same time provide a
reliable source of energy, but it also creates long-term risks for future generations
due to the need to store the radioactive waste for thousands of year. It thus
introduces the value dimension of intergenerational justice and creates new moral
overload. The design of new reactor types and novel fuel cycles is now explored to
deal with those problems (Taebi and Kadak 2010).
Second, technical innovation may introduce choice in situations in which there
was previously no choice. An example is prenatal diagnostics. This technology
creates the possibility to predict that an as yet unborn child will have a certain
disease with a certain probability. This raises the question whether it is desirable to
abort the foetus in certain circumstances. This choice situation is characterised by a
conﬂict between the value of life (even if this life is not perfect) and the value of
avoiding unnecessary suffering. Given that prenatal diagnostic technologies
introduce such new moral dilemmas one can wonder whether the development of
such technologies meets principle (BF1/BF2). The same applies to the technologies
for human enhancement that are now foreseen in the ﬁeld of nanotechnology and
converging technologies.
Implications for the Responsibility of Engineers
We have seen that while technological innovation might be a means to fulﬁl
principle (BF1/BF2), not all innovations meet principle (BF1/BF2). We think this
has direct implications for the responsibility of engineers that develop new
technology. We suggest that engineers, and other actors involved in technological
development, have a moral responsibility to see to it that the technologies that they
develop meet principle (BF1/BF2).
Thishigherordermoralobligationtoseetoitthatcanbedonewhatoughttobedone
can be construed as an important aspect of an engineer’s task responsibility. This has
beendescribedasameta-taskresponsibility(VandenHoven1998;Rooksby2009),or
an obligation to see to it (by designing an artifact) that one self or others (users or
clients) can do what ought to be done.
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Design. In Value Sensitive Design the focus is on incorporating moral values into
the design of technical artifacts and systems by looking at design from an ethical
perspective concerned with the way moral values such as freedom from bias, trust,
autonomy, privacy, and justice, are facilitated or constrained (Friedman et al. 2006;
Flanagan et al. 2008; Van den Hoven 2005). Value Sensitive Design focuses
primarily and speciﬁcally on addressing values of moral import. Other frameworks
tend to focus more on functional and instrumental values, such as speed, efﬁciency,
storage capacity or usability. Although building a user-friendly technology might
have the side-effect of increasing a user’s trust or sense of autonomy, in Value
Sensitive Design the incorporation of moral values into the design is a primary goal
instead of a by-product. According to Friedman, Value-Sensitive Design is
primarily concerned with values that centre on human well-being, human dignity,
justice, welfare, and human rights (Friedman et al. 2006). It requires that we
broaden the goals and criteria for judging the quality of technological systems to
include explicitly moral values Value Sensitive Design is at the same time, as
pointed out by Van den Hoven (2005), ‘‘a way of doing ethics that aims at making
moral values part of technological design, research and development’’. More
speciﬁcally it looks at ways of reconciling different and opposing values in
engineering design or innovations, so that we may have our cake and eat it (Van den
Hoven 2008). Value Sensitive Design may thus be an excellent way to meet
principle (BF1/BF2) through technical innovation.
Conclusion
In discussions about technology, engineering and ethics, technology and engineer-
ing are usually treated as the source of ethical problems, and ethics is treated as a
constraint on engineering and technological development. We have shown that also
a quite different relation exists between these realms. Ethics can be the source of
technological development rather than just a constraint and technological progress
can create moral progress rather than just moral problems. We have shown this by a
detailed analysis of how technology can contribute to the solution of so-called moral
overload or moral dilemmas. Such dilemmas typically create a moral residue that is
the basis of a second-order principle that tells us to reshape the world so that we can
meet all our moral obligations. We can do so, among other things, through guided
technological innovation. We have suggested Value Sensitive Design as a possible
approach to guide the engineering design process in the right direction.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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